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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

Plaintiffs-Respondents, Paynes, sued their adjoining land owners,
Defendants-appellants, Stewarts, to quiet title to a strip of land used as a
lane or road.

This land is described in Stewarts1 deed, but Paynes claim

boundary by acquiescence.

Plaintiffs further demanded that defendants re-

move certain bridges and a cattle loading ramp adjoining and partially on
the property in question.
Stewarts counterclaimed alleging that they had an easement of ingress
and egress in said lane or road.

Stewarts also sought to have the plaintiffs

enjoined from using a well which had been allegedly opened unlawfully and
which may adversely affect defendants1 own culinary well.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted fee simple title to the strip of land in
dispute to Plaintiffs-Respondents holding that Defendants-Appellants had
acquiesced in the boundary as alleged by plaintiffs. The trial court further
ordered the Defendants-Appellants to remove bridges and a cattle chute which
were partially located on the property in dispute and denied DefendantsAppellants any use in the road or lane.

The court made no finding with

respect to Defendants claim that the well be shut down.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek reversal of the ruling that plaintiffs
have acquired a portion of defendants1 property by acquiescence.

Defendants-

appellants also seek reversal of the ruling of the trial court to the extent
that said ruling denies defendants-appellants an easement of the lane in
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question for access to a portion of their property.

Defendants seek a

ruling preventing plaintiffs1 use of the said illegal well.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants-Appellants, Stewarts, are owners of what is commonly
known as the Stewart Ranch which has been owned by the Stewart family since
1852. Plaintiffs-Respondents, Paynes, purchased an adjoining farm in 1942.
Paynes claim that an area approximately 25 feet wide and 370 feet long
along the southwest side of the 40 acre farm has been acquired by them
through the acquiescence of the defendants.
and the area shaded in green).

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2

This area has been used continuously since

settlement of the area as a road or lane. Among other things, this road
was used as an access to property which had in the past been known as the
Andrew Stewart farm. After Andrew Stewart died, Mrs. Stewart farmed the
property herself and in some years leased the property out.
Some time after 1942, plaintiffs purchased the Andrew Stewart
property.

(Tr. 29, 30 and 142) Originally, fences were located along both

sides of the roadway but the west fence was removed at some undetermined
time.

(Tr. 162)

4000 West.

This roadway is an extension to the county road known as

The oiled portion of this road ends just west of the Stewart

home at a place marked "end of oil" on plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 2. From
there, the roadway and irrigation ditch turns to the southeast approximately
90 to 100 feet, crossing the section line described as South 0°13f27fl west
into the area shaded as green on plaintiffs1 Exhibit 2. This green shaded
area is described in defendant's deeds but not in plaintiffs' deeds. This
is the area claimed by Paynes.
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In 1966, Stewarts moved to the property and thereafter moved their
corrals from the former location to the present spot (marked with an "A"
on Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1). The defendants constructed two bridges and a
cattle chute across anirrigation ditch which runs along the lane or
property in dispute in order to gain access to the corrals. Plaintiffs
brought the instant action to prevent defendants1 use of the lane,

POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE TWO PROPERTIES HAD BEEN
RECOGNIZED AS BEING LOCATED ALONG THE LINE
CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS SINCE TERRITORIAL DAYS

The trial court found that the line claimed by plaintiffs has been
recognized by the parties and their predecessors in interest as the boundary
between the properties since territorial days (Rec. at 15). This holding
failed to take into consideration the fact that the question before the court
was limited to defendant's acquiescence, if any, since 1942, Opposing
counsel stated at trial that "Our claim is that we have had exclusive
possession since 1942" (Tr. at 8).

Plaintiffs1 complaint put only the period

of plaintiffs1 occupation in issue - not that of any predecessor and the
parties presented evidence on this question.
There was testimony with respect to the use of the road prior to
1942, but this testimony was primarily to show the existence of gates, fences,
and bridges as they existed in 1942 and since. The undisputed evidence at
trial showed that the adjacent land owners during the 1920's and 1930's did
not consider the existing fence to be the boundary (Tr. 146 and 161). In
fact, during that period, there were fences on both sides of the road so one
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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party would not have occupied the road more than any other (Tr. at 142, 146
and 162). Moreover, during the 1930's the lane used to lead to a third
farm*

This lane was used as the only access to that farm until plaintiffs

purchased that farm some time after 1942 (Tr. 42-43).
It was concluded by plaintiffs' own counsel that there was common
useage in the area during the 1930's with the agreement of the adjacent land
owners (Tr. at 178).
Plaintiffs' complaint makes no allegation or claim since territorial
days. Plaintiffs1 counsel a£ppe&£#r&b at trial that their claim was only since
1942. The trial court's ruling was therefore in error that the lane was
recognized as being plaintiffs' and plaintiffs' predecessors' property since
territorial days.

POINT II
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN
THERE IS NO UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE LOCATION
OF THE TRUE BOUNDARY LINE
Before a boundary can be established by acquiescence, the location
of the actual boundary must be in dispute or unknown. Without this element,
if plaintiffs are to obtain an interest in defendants' land, it must be by
way of adverse possession or prescriptive use.

In the instant case, the

actual boundary was known by both parties.
Plaintiff LaVon^ Payne was aware shortly after he acquired the
property of the actual location of the property line (Tr. at 38). At one
time he informed defaadants' mother that the property line ran right through
her house (Tr. at 79).

It is equally clear that defendant Stewarts knew of
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the location of the property line (Tr. at 189).
The question of whether adjacent land owners establish a boundary
by acquiescence when the actual boundary is known was decided by the Utah
Supreme Court in Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 59, 276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417
(1928).

Therein, the court stated:
"It thus becomes of controlling importance to determine
whether two adjacent land owners may establish a boundary
line between their lands by oral agreement or by acquiescence for a long period of time, when there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary line,
and where it is known by them at all times, that the
boundary sought to be established is not the true
boundary line." 74 Utah 69-70

The issue of the instant case is similar.

In Tripp v. Bagley, the Utah Supreme

Court held that co-terminous landowners could not establish a valid boundary
line by parol agreement or acquiescence if the location of the true line were
known.

74 Utah 71-72.
There was no evidence introduced at trial tending to show that the

actual boundary was ever unknown by plaintiffs or defenhnts.
evidence was to the contrary.

In fact, the

Thus, in the instant case, boundary by

acquiescence does not apply and plaintiffs1 case must stand or fall on the
doctrines of adverse possession or prescriptive use.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT A
NEW BOUNDARY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH OPERATION
OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE

Plaintiffs did not prove elements necessary to establish boundary
by acquiescence.

These elements include:
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1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments,

fences or buildings.
2.

Acquiescence in the line of the boundary by adjoining land

owners.
3. For a long period of years.
See Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 157; 389 P.2d 143, 145 (1964); See also
Nunley v. Walker, 13 Utah 2d, 105; 369 P.2d 117 (1962); Brown v. Milliner,
120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951); Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725 (1974); See also
note "Boundaries by Agreement and Acquiescence in Utah11 1975 Law Review, 224.
Each of these elements will be explored to show that the evidence
does not support a finding that these elements were established:
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely.
In Harding v. Allen, 10 Utah 2d 370, 353 P.2d 911 (1960), the

Utah Supreme Court held that in order to show occupancy it must be shown that
the claiming party:
11

. . . occupied it thus at such reasonable intervals
and during a period within which a boundary by
acquiescence might be acquired, as to have knowledge
of the physical facts that through passage of time,
might create rights in others, to his land under the
doctrine, with an opportunity to interrupt their
fruition.11 10 Utah 2d at 373.
Plaintiffs1 claim to occupation is that they have used the lane,
but it was stipulated at trial by plaintiffs that many other people had used
the road as well.

(Tr. at 178).

Plaintiffs installed a gate across the lane at a time not indicated
in the record. By plaintiff LaVon Payne's own statements, however, it is
clear that the purpose of this gate was not to serve as possession or
occupancy but only to keep pheasant hunters out during the pheasant hunt.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Once in a while Mrs. Payne would see cattle in the lane, apparently on the
county roadway further north, and he would return and close this gate.

All

in all, the gate would be closed approximately ten times in an entire year
(Tr. at 91-92).
2.

Acquiescence in the Line of the Boundary.
Acquiescence in the line of the boundary requires conduct

"nearly synonymous with 'indolence1 or 'conscience by consent1 or 'consent
by silence' or a knowledge that a fence or other monuments (appear) to be
a boundary, - but no one did anything about it."

Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d

119, 505 P.2d 1199 at 1200 (1973).
It was undisputed at trial that the adjacent landowners used
the strip of land in question during the 1920's and 1930's (Tr. at 159 and
142).

In 1942, plaintiffs purchased the property adjacent to the Stewart

farm.

Sometime later, a fence that had bordered the lane on the Payne side

of the road was apparently removed (Tr. at 162). If this act is to be
asserted as the beginning date of the alleged occupancy, the Stewarts must
have had some knowledge of the fact.

On the contrary, fence lines in the

area are only for purposes of separating farmed land from roadways and as
a general rule are not recognized as boundary lines.

(Tr. at 107-108).

By

plaintiff LaVon Payne's own admission, however, no one was living at the
Stewart home when he had purchased his land.

(Tr. at 216). Defendant Walter

Stewart was a bomber pilot from 1942-1946 (Tr. at 187). From and after the
1940's the undisputed evidence showed that the farm was rented to such
tenants as Carl Lindstrom, Bob Jensen and Art Hansen (Tr. at 190).
these tenants had no power or ability to acquiese in the location
of a boundary other than the actual boundary line.

Fuco v. Williams, 18
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Utah 2d 282, 286, 421 P.2d 944 (1969).

See also 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 79

p. 652. During the 1920's and 1930's access to some of the Stewart property
had occurred by using the strip of land in dispute, crossing the irrigation
ditch by way of a moveable bridge and going through gates that had been
constructed for this purpose (Tr. at 190). The tenants leasing the farm,
however, had no need to use the lane, however, because their own properties
were adjacent to the Stewart farm and they had better access over their own
lands (Tr. at 190).
During the period that the farm was leased, it is difficult to
imagine what the Stewarts should have done to interrupt the claimed
acquiescence.

The tenants who ran the farm had no need to use the road.

Moreover, as long as the farm was leased, the Stewarts had no need to use
the road. The fact that the fence was torn down on the Payne side of the
road did not require the Stewarts to affirmatively rebuild it, in order to
prevent the beginning of an acquiescence.
As stated in Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 273; 209 P.2d 257,
360 (1949), and quoted with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Ringwood
v. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 121; 269 P.2d 1053 (1954):
"The theory under which a boundary line is established
by long acquiescence along an existing fence line is
founded on the doctrine that the parties erect the
fence to settle some doubt or uncertainty which they
may have as to the location of the true boundary,
and the (sic) compromise their differences by agreeing to accept the fence line as the limiting line of
their respecting lands. The mere fact that a fence
happens to be put up and neither party does anything
about it for a long period of time will not establish
it as the true boundary. Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah
89, 34 Pv2d 697; Tripp v. Bagley, supra.11

-8-

*
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3. For a Long Period of Years
Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that they have
had exclusive possession of the road in question for approximately 40 years.
Plaintiffs1 counsel conceded at trial, however, that the claim begins in
1942.

Plaintiffs first purchased the property in 1942 but did not actually

move to the property until 1949 or 1950 (Tr. at 100-101).

Tenants rented

the Stewart farm for a considerable period of time (Tr. at 190). It seems
clear, therefore, that no period of acquiescence can begin to run until 1966
when defendants moved back to the Stewart farm

(Tr. at 175).

Defendant Walt Stewart conceded that Mr. Payne had maintained the
lane most of the time since 1966, but it was undisputed that Stewart had
put some-gravel on the road. Mr. Payne also admitted that Stewart told him
he intended to gravel part of the area for a parking space (Tr. at 92-93).
In 1972, Mr. Stewart began construction of a bridge across the
irrigation ditch at the location of the gate opening onto the lane that had
been built in the 1930fs.

(Tr. 179 and 189-190).

Thus, any acquiescence

that might have begun in 1966 was halted in 1972 - a period of only six
years.
t

On the other hand, plaintiffs are unable to show any time when the
fence along the east side the lane began to be acquiesced in as being the
boundary line.

(Tr. at 140-142).

In the 1920fs and 1930's both landowners

used the lane as well as the operators of the Eliza or Andrew Stewart farm
(Tr. at 142-143). After 1942 when plaintiffs purchased their land there was
no evidence introduced that showed that the Stewarts knew or should have known
that Paynes claimed the strip of land in question from 1942 through 1966.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There being no substantial evidence to the contrary, plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of proof that defendants had acquiesed in the
boundary as claimed by plaintiff.

POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING DEFENDANTS
ACCESS TO THE LANE

The trial court erred in ruling that defendants had no right to
use the lane. By plaintiffs1 own admission, LaVon Payne suggested in the
latter part of the 1960fs that it would be wise for Stewarts to move their
corrals from where they were located to the south corner of their property
(the present location of the corrals is marked by an "A" on Plfs1 Exh. 1).
Any other access to these corrals at their new location is infeasible
(Tr. atll98).
In 1972, Walt Stewart began the construction of the bridge at the
location of the gate that had been built in the 1930's. Mr. Payne admitted
that he came and saw a pile of gravel next to the ditch where this bridge
was going to be constructed.

During the construction of the bridge, Payne

drove by many times within a few feet of where the bridge was being
constructed and the parties waved at each other (Tr. at 195). LaVon Payne
admits that he saw construction of the permanent bridge (Tr. at 221). It
was undisputed that it was approximately two and one-half years from the
date of trial from the time when Stewart had moved his corrals from the north
part of the house down to the southwest part of the property.

Construction

on the corrals began in 1972, probably during the month of May, and

-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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continued thereafter.

(Tr. at 190) Plaintiffs1 complaint was filed in June

of 1974. During this period of time, there was no evidence that would inform Stewart that he could not use the lane, the cattle chute, and bridges
he was constructing, except a suggestion at one point by Payne that Stewart
construct a road elsewhere after the work was well underway.
It is clear from reviewing the photographs (Defs. Exhs. 3 and 4,
Plfs. Exhs. 11 and 12) that the cattle chute and bridges were constructed at
considerable expense and effort. To require their removal would be unconscionable inasmuch as the corrals were moved to their present location at
the suggestion of the plaintiff, Mr. Payne.
It is not a necessary element of estoppel in this case that at the
time of Payne's suggestion that Stewart move his corrals, that plaintiffs then
intended to prevent Stewart's subsequent use of the road.

Estopping conduct

may "consist in the subsequent attempt to controvert the representation and
get rid of its effects.11

28 Am.Jur. Estoppel and Waiver §43.

There is no dispute herein but that Payne suggested that the corrals
be moved, that the corrals were in fact moved and that the only available
access without traveling a considerable distance or removing the trees and lawn
of the Stewart yard was the strip of land that makes up the lane. Defendants
should not now be barred from using the lane and the lower court's judgment
denying plaintiffs use of the roadway in question should be reversed.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF
CONTINUED USE OF THE WELL IN QUESTION

In 1934, Payne's predecessor in interest, Tucker, drilled a deep
well near the Stewart property line. The well adversely affected the Stewart
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well and was capped for over 15 years (Tr. at 111-112).

This left the Tucker

(later Payne) home a two-inch culinary well which supplied plenty of water
(Tr. at 168). Subsequently, both homes were connected to the deep well without a permit from the State Engineer even though the well had not been used
for over 15 years (Tr. at 225). In 1970, Payne disconnected the Stewart
home from the well (Tr. at 203).
The plaintiffs admittedly did not obtain a permit from the State
Engineer to kook onto the well (Tr. at 225). Since defendants have now been
prevented from using the deep well by Mr. Payne, their own water source is
put in jeopardy by Payne1s use of the deep well (Tr. at 166 and 147).
Utah Code Annotated, Section 73-1-4 clearly provides that water not
used or abandoned for five years reverts to the public.
City v. Whitmore, 107 Utah 445, 154 P.2d 748 (1944).

See also, Murray

The well should be

capped until a permit therefor issues from the State Engineer.

CONCLUSION
Defendants should be allowed to use the lane on the basis that they
have not acquiesed in Payne's ownership thereof.
To hold that the defendants1 belief, reliance, and
occupation up to the fence line, without more, are
controlling in a boundary dispute, would be to
ignore the statutory guides for adverse possession
since she did not pay the taxes on that portion of
land which she claims. 2 Utah 2d 119 at 123, 269
P.2d 103 (1954).
Defendants are further entitled to use the lane based upon the
equitable doctrine of estoppel.
Plaintiffs should be required to discontinue use of the deep well
near defendants1 property, or get a lawful permit from the State Engineer
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This would afford defendants the opportunity to be heard as to the effect
of this well on their own well.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER T. STEWART
Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant by mailing two
copies thereof, postage prepaid, to M. Dayle Jeffs, Jeffs & Jeffs, Attorney
for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 90 North 100 East, Provo, Utah
day of

84601, this

, 1976.
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